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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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Note on Classification

The over-all classification of this report is Top Secret. Portions of the report are of lower classification and are so designated.

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
The Intelligence Advisory Committee	1
The Evolution of the I.A.C.	1
The Coordination of National Intelligence Estimates	8
The Coordination of Intelligence Activities	12
Subordinate Committees of the I.A.C.	14

Appendix A — Permanent Committees of the I.A.C.

Appendix B — Selected Actions of the Intelligence  
Advisory Committee Exclusive of National  
Intelligence Estimates. (Under Separate  
Cover)

Appendix C — Statutory Authority and Basic Directives

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Chairman -

Mr. Allen W. Dulles,  
Director of Central Intelligence

Members -

Mr. W. Park Armstrong,  
Special Assistant for Intelligence,  
Department of State

Major General Arthur G. Trudeau,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Department of the Army

Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe,  
Director of Naval Intelligence,  
Department of the Navy

Major General John A. Samford,  
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,  
United States Air Force

Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton,  
Deputy Director for Intelligence,  
The Joint Staff

Mr. Harry S. Traynor,  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Representative to the IAC

Mr. Ralph R. Roach,  
Acting for Assistant to the Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Secretary -

[Redacted]  
Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates  
Central Intelligence Agency

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THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

As presently constituted, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) consists of the following officials:

The Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman  
The Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State  
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army  
The Director of Naval Intelligence  
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force  
The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC  
The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The function of the IAC is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his statutory responsibilities (see NSCID-1).

THE EVOLUTION OF THE I.A.C.

Beginning with General Donovan's original proposals, in June 1941, it has always been considered that a committee composed of the heads of the several departmental intelligence agencies should be an essential element in any plan for the coordination of the national intelligence effort. In times past, however, there has been considerable controversy regarding the proper relationship between such a committee and the director of central intelligence: that

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is, whether the committee's function should be to advise and assist a director individually responsible to higher authority, or whether the committee itself should function as a collectively responsible board of directors, the director being merely an executive officer responsible to it. These conflicting concepts have been referred to in brief as the principles of individual versus collective responsibility.

Donovan strongly advocated the principle of individual responsibility, but his concept of an individual "coordinator of strategic information" was too novel and undeveloped to be accepted in 1941. The solution then adopted, under pressure of the war emergency, was the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In imitation of the British JIC, this Committee included representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of Strategic Services, as well as the heads of the three service intelligence agencies, but it lacked both the British team spirit and such personal leadership and responsibility as was vested in the British JIC chairman. Wartime experience with the hindrances resulting from diffusion of responsibility in a committee system finally made the case for the principle of individual responsibility.

Several plans were proposed for a postwar organization for the coordination of the national intelligence effort. That ultimately adopted was based on proposals by Donovan as modified by the JIC after a bitter internal struggle. It was subsequently adopted by the JCS, subjected to thorough examination by the Lovett Committee on behalf of the Secretary of War, and recommended to the

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President by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. In this plan the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was made responsible to a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the committee of heads of departmental intelligence agencies, called the Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) was made expressly advisory in its relationship to him.

The principle of collective responsibility had been strongly advocated before the Lovett Committee, and had been deliberately rejected by it. In his presentation to the three Secretaries, Lovett had emphasized that the DCI should consult the IAB in all important matters, but that he must himself retain the power of decision, in keeping with his individual responsibility to the NIA, while reporting to the NIA any substantial dissent by any IAB member. Such was the approved doctrine when the Central Ingelligence Group (CIG) was established pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946. (See also NIA Directive No. 1, 8 February 1946.)

Admiral Souers, the first Director of Central Intelligence, fully understood the Lovett doctrine. At the same time he was careful to cultivate the goodwill and cooperation of the IAB members. He consulted fully with them, but, inasmuch as few plans for coordination and no national intelligence estimates were produced during his brief tenure, no firm precedents in DCI-IAB relations were set.

General Vandenberg succeeded Admiral Souers as DCI in June 1946. He was determined to make CIG an independent, self-sufficient intelligence agency and in the process to reduce the departmental agencies to small units restricted

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to technical matters of exclusively departmental interest. This determination brought him into conflict with the members of the IAB, whose rice bowls were to be broken. The issue came to a head in Vandenberg's proposals that he be authorized to engage in independent intelligence research at his discretion and to act as executive agent of the NIA in coordinating and supervising the departmental agencies. Vandenberg had to forego executive supervision of the departmental agencies, but otherwise he did obtain from the NIA substantially the authority he wanted. (See NIA Directive No. 5, 8 July 1946.) Thereafter he proceeded to build up CIG in competition with the departmental agencies and with scant regard for the IAB.

Such was the state of affairs while the National Security Act of 1947 was in preparation. The Act established the Central Intelligence Agency as an independent agency under the direction of the National Security Council. It made the Director of Central Intelligence solely responsible for advising the NSC in intelligence matters, making recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of intelligence activities, preparing national intelligence estimates, and performing such other services as the NSC might direct. The Act intentionally made no reference to any committee analogous to the IAB. Under its terms, subject to NSC direction, any consultation with the heads of the departmental agencies would be a matter of the Director's own convenience and discretion.

It may be noted parenthetically that the National Security Act of 1947 also omitted any reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee, or to any intelligence function in the JCS and Joint Staff. The JIC owes its continued existence to the discretion exercised by the JCS in organizing the Joint Staff. The conflict

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between the principles of individual and collective responsibility arose in that connection also. An attempt was made to establish individual responsibility by the designation of a Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Intelligence in charge of the Joint Intelligence Group. However, inasmuch as the work of the Group was subject to the review and approval of the JIC, the principle of collective responsibility prevailed there and the Deputy Director for Intelligence became in effect an executive officer responsible to the JIC as a board of directors.

Admiral Hillenkoetter relieved General Vandenberg as Director of Central Intelligence on 1 May 1947. Realizing that Vandenberg's embattled relations with the IAB had been harmful to proper coordination of the national intelligence effort, Hillenkoetter voluntarily sought and obtained the revocation of NIA Directive No. 5. He hoped thereby to restore mutual confidence and cooperation. However, certain members of the IAB (Admiral Ingles and General Chamberlain) took advantage of his conciliatory attitude to press for establishment of the principle of collective responsibility in the drafting of NSC Intelligence Directive No. 1. The ensuing controversy became so intense that Hillenkoetter requested the intervention of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal very forcefully instructed his subordinates on this point, and consequently NSCID-1 was drawn up on Admiral Hillenkoetter's terms.

NSCID-1 establishes the Intelligence Advisory Committee as it is presently constituted. In consonance with the National Security Act itself, it leaves the Director of Central Intelligence solely responsible for the advice, recommendations, and intelligence which he submits to the NSC, and for the

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other services which he performs. It does require, however, that he consult with the IAC with respect to his recommendations and estimates in order to obtain their concurrence or to report any substantial dissent.

Despite this further authoritative decision on the issue of individual versus collective responsibility, Admiral Hillenkoetter's relations with the IAC remained strained, his antagonists having been convinced against their will. Certain practices and procedures which he had inherited (see below) continued to produce friction with the departmental agencies, and, in the circumstances, he was unable to ameliorate the situation without compromising his authority and responsibility under the Statute and NSCID-1. This he was not willing to do. Consequently he came to make no more use of the IAC than NSCID-1 absolutely required.

The continuation of this unsatisfactory situation caused the NSC to establish the Dulles-Corea-Jackson Study Group to look into the matter and recommend remedial action. The Group's report, dated 1 January 1949, was highly critical of CIA, attributing the Agency's shortcomings primarily to the Director's failure to enlist the cooperation and participation of the IAC with respect to both coordination and estimates. The report contained one internal inconsistency. The section on coordination stressed the Director's obligation to exert leadership and recognized the function of the IAC as advisory, but that on estimates espoused the doctrine of collective responsibility.

The DCI and the members of the IAC were invited to comment on the Dulles Report and did so, the IAC members seizing the opportunity to renew their drive to establish the principle of collective responsibility. The NSC found that

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it could not readily digest the cumulative volume of controversial literature. It therefore requested the Secretaries of State and Defense to prepare a succinct action paper for its consideration.

The Secretaries' report, NSC 50, 1 July 1949, was actually prepared by General McNarney. It held that, under more forthright leadership by the DCI, the IAC should participate more actively in the coordination of intelligence activities and the adoption of national intelligence estimates, but only as an advisory body. It again expressly rejected the doctrine of collective responsibility. It was NSC 50, not the Dulles Report, which the NSC finally adopted as direction to the DCI.

Even this did not solve the problem, for the DCI and the IAC found themselves unable to agree regarding the implementation of NSC 50. On the ground that NSC 50 had been systematically frustrated, the members of the IAC were actively preparing a new approach to the NSC designed to advance the cause of collective responsibility when Admiral Hillenkoetter was relieved as DCI and General Bedell Smith was called to take his place.

At his first meeting with the IAC, on 20 October 1950, General Smith announced a new era in DCI-IAC relations, stressing the necessity of active collaboration and collective judgment. To some of those present his remarks may have sounded like an acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility. On another occasion, however, when an exuberant member of the IAC referred to it as a board of directors, General Smith cut him short, reminding him and his colleagues of the individual responsibility and authority of the DCI. General Smith had the personal prestige necessary to maintain his leadership and individual

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authority, but the point is that, by invoking full IAC participation in a collective effort, he rendered it unnecessary to assert such authority.

The present position is that established by General Smith. Under the law and NSC direction, the Director is solely responsible for the recommendations and estimates which he submits to the NSC and retains a corresponding power of personal decision regarding them, but the IAC participates fully and actively in their preparation and normally concurs in them, with provision for the free expression of any dissenting opinion.

The IAC now meets regularly once a week and occasionally in additional special session. About 40 percent of its actions concern the review and final adoption of national intelligence estimates. An additional 37 percent are related to estimates production (initiation, programming, release, etc.). About 23 percent of its actions concern the interdepartmental coordination of other intelligence activities. In point of time, about three-fourths of the IAC's meeting time is given to discussion of the substance of estimates.

#### THE COORDINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

In the earlier planning stages and during Admiral Souers' brief tenure as DCI, the common understanding was that national intelligence estimates would be drafted by a CIG staff on the basis of current departmental estimates and special departmental contributions, as required; would be thoroughly coordinated at the working level in conferences between the CIG estimators and departmental representatives; and would be finally reviewed,

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amended if necessary, and adopted at meetings of the DCI with the IAB. In working level coordination the DCI's representative would have the power of decision with respect to the text to be submitted, taking into account the views of the departmental representatives and ensuring that divergent opinions on substantial issues were duly reported with the adopted text. The Director would exercise the same power of decision at his level, taking into consideration the advice of the IAB and reporting in the published estimate any divergent opinion on a substantial issue. The CIG, however, was never able to produce an estimate during Admiral Souers' time, so that this contemplated procedure was never established in practice.

The initiative in departing from this originally intended procedure is attributable, not to General Vandenberg, but to the IAB itself, although its members were undoubtedly influenced by the hostilities which had already developed over NIA Directive No. 5. First, IAB members demanded that Vandenberg make his estimators stop calling for contributions from their overworked staffs. Then the IAB representatives refused to attend conferences with CIG, resorting instead to written comment on draft estimates. These developments compelled CIG to rely primarily upon its own intelligence research, precluded the possibility of reaching a consensus in joint discussion, and reduced the coordination process to a solicitation, by mail, of concurrence, comment, or dissent from agencies whose interest was essentially negative (to prevent any CIG action possibly prejudicial to their own interests) rather than positive (to make a constructive contribution to the development of an authoritative national estimate). To complete the ruin, General Vandenberg's

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relations with the IAB were such that he never submitted an estimate to consideration at a meeting with the IAB. CIG, in effect, abandoned its mission as coordinator to become a competing fifth intelligence agency, perhaps more objective than others because of its freedom from departmental policy bias, but under a peculiar obligation to submit its product to the criticism of its competitors. The procedure of "coordination" which evolved in these circumstances could hardly have been more rigid, indirect, cumbersome, and sterile. The result was neither true independence of action and judgment nor a true collective effort in the national interest.

This situation was improved to some extent during Admiral Hillenkoetter's time, but the basic pattern remained unchanged. Under the terms of DCID-3/1, 8 July 1948, CIA undertook to notify the IAC agencies of projects undertaken by request or on its own initiative. It might or might not request contributions. In due course draft estimates, usually based for the most part on CIA's own research, were submitted to the IAC agencies for written comment. Divergent views revealed by such comments were discussed with representatives of the agencies concerned. Ultimately CIA submitted a final draft to the members of the IAC for their written concurrence or dissent. The IAC never met to discuss the substance of an estimate.

Within this framework, CIA personnel often made earnest and laborious efforts to achieve a true coordination. At the working level there was considerable consultation and cooperation with regard to terms of reference, contributions, and preliminary drafts. The most thorough working level coordination, however, gave no assurance regarding final action at the IAC

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level. The entire process seemed discouragingly involved, time-consuming, and sometimes futile. Nevertheless, CIA did produce, during this period, a considerable body of estimates as well coordinated as any today. About ~~lengthen~~ three-fourths of them had the full concurrence of all members of the IAC. In most other cases, the dissents were similar in number and kind to those now published. There were, however, a few cases of spectacular failure in coordination.

A more significant consequence of the difficulty of the coordination process was an increasing tendency on the part of CIA to divert its effort from the production of coordinated estimates to the production of uncoordinated current intelligence publications and miscellaneous research reports. This tendency was undirected and largely unconscious but was basically pre-determined by the organizational and functional structure which General Vandenberg had purposefully created. It alarmed anew the IAC agencies, especially State, and was severely condemned by the Dulles Report. No effective action was taken in the matter, however, until the coming of General Smith, when the entire process of estimates production and coordination was completely transformed.

The organization and procedures established by General Smith and now in effect are essentially a return to the concept held by Admiral Souers at the beginning. The Office of National Estimates, the responsible office within CIA, is composed of the Board of National Estimates, a small group of senior officials distinguished for pertinent experience and aptitude (e.g., Dr. Sherman Kent, Lieut. General Harold Bull), and a small, select supporting

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staff. The Office has no other function than the drafting and coordination of national intelligence estimates. The procedure of coordination is outlined in DCID-3/5, 1 September 1953. The estimates production program is developed by the Board in coordination with IAC representatives, and is adopted by the IAC. The estimates are drafted by ONE on the basis of contributions received from the IAC agencies pursuant to agreed terms of reference and are thoroughly coordinated at meetings with IAC representatives prior to their submission to the IAC. At such meetings all differences are normally resolved, but if, in the judgment of the Board, the nature of the issue requires it, a Board position is taken and divergent views are duly recorded. IAC action on a well-coordinated estimate may be no more than ratification of the agreement reached at the working level. When there are unresolved issues, however, the IAC discusses them fully and either resolves them or else accepts the notation of a dissenting opinion with understanding and goodwill on the part of all concerned.

#### THE COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The development of procedures for the coordination of intelligence activities has roughly paralleled that with respect to the coordination of estimates. Admiral Scoures contemplated full consultation with the IAB in such matters, but the concept was lost in the controversy between General Vandenberg

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and the IAB over NIA Directive No. 5. Thereafter plans for coordination were developed in CIA with little or no consultation with the departmental agencies, and were then submitted to a process of formal and indirect coordination like that for estimates. Final IAB action was normally obtained by the marking of voting slips. Actual IAB meetings to discuss such matters were rare, but were occasionally held, as they never were to consider estimates.

The Director's staff for the preparation of such plans was called ICAPS (Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff). It was composed of personnel detailed from the several Departments, but represented the Director rather than the IAB agencies. During General Vandenberg's time the IAC customarily established ad hoc committees to deal with ICAPS in particular cases. At Admiral Hillenkoetter's request, a Standing Committee of the IAC was established in lieu of these ad hoc committees, but that made no appreciable difference. In either case, CIA (ICAPS) was confronted by the IAC representatives in battle array and there was no common approach to the solution of common problems in the national interest.

As with respect to estimates, General Smith abolished his predecessors' arrangements and established a small office, the Office of Intelligence Coordination, clearly integral to CIA and responsible to him, to serve as his agent in the development of plans for the coordination of intelligence

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activities, but to do so in close collaboration with IAC representatives. This office also served as the IAC secretariat. In effect its head, as IAC secretary, formed various ad hoc committees to deal with particular problems, as the IAC might direct, and then served as their chairman. The office consisted only of himself and one or two assistants.

Recently, in recognition of the fact that IAC meetings were preponderantly concerned with the consideration of national intelligence estimates and related matters, the IAC secretaryship was reassigned to the Deputy Assistant Director for National Estimates and OIC's coordinating function and personnel were transferred to the Director's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination.

#### SUBORDINATE COMMITTEES OF THE I.A.C.

For the continuing coordination of certain intelligence activities, the DCI and IAC have established ten permanent committees composed of representatives of CIA and of other agencies, as appropriate. There follows a list of these committees, with the dates of their establishment.

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)	31 December 1947
Interdepartmental Committee for the Implementation and Coordination of NSCID-7	12 February 1948
NIS Committee	1948

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